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2 Synopsis
by Patrick Grady*
Veil after veil will lift - but there must be veil upon veil
behind.
Sir Edwin Arnold, The Light of Asia
The existence and importance for public and busi-
ness policy of inflation-induced distortions in financial
reporting and taxation was universally recognized by
the speakers at the conference. There was much less
agreement on the precise nature of the distortions
themselves. Disagreement was rife over the appropri-
ate modifications to financial reporting and taxation
required to cope with the distortions. But the need for
further experimentation in this complex area was
widely perceived.
This synopsis summarizes the major issues
debated at the conference. It is necessarily some-
what impressionistic and leaps from theme to theme,
juxtaposing remarks made at different times in the
conference on similar themes in order to sharpen our
focus on areas of agreement and disagreement
among the participants.
Because of the view, which found some currency at
the conference, that, when it comes to inflation
adjustment, financial reporting and taxation each
have their own separate aspects, the synopsis deals
with these topics one at a time, starting with financial
reporting, in many ways the more fundamental of the
two. But the two issues are obviously very closely and
inextricably related.
Inflation-Induced Distortions
in Financial Reporting
The Nature of the Distortions
Evidence on distortions in the aggregate was
provided by Abraham Tarasofsky. As he noted, there
are several adjustments to book operating income
(the sum of profits and interest expense) that must be
made in order to offset the distortions caused by
inflation and thus obtain a better estimate of the real
underlying profit situation. Two of these adjustments
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reflect the difference between replacement cost
depreciation and cost of goods sold and historical
cost. These adjustments must be made because,
unless a firm covers its replacement costs, it cannot
maintain its fixed capital and inventories and remain
in the same general line of business in the long run. A
third adjustment is for the erosion in other working
capital. It has a similar justification. These three
adjustments yield real before-tax operating income,
which, when taken as a proportion of capital
employed, produces the before-tax real rate of return
on capital employed. The after-tax equivalent is
obtained by deducting actual income tax paid. A
further and more controversial adjustment for gains
on debt must also be made. The result, reflecting the
fact that equity shareholders benefit from the
reduced real value of outstanding debt, is called the
real rate of return on net worth.
Tarasofsky's rate of return estimates for both the
non-farm, non-financial sector and manufacturing
show a large gap between nominal and real after-tax
rates of return on capital employed that opens up
with inflation. For the non-farm, non-financial sector,
the gap goes from 2 to 3 per cent in the mid-1960s to
8 to 10 per cent in the late 1970s. The real rate of
return remains fairly stable around 5 per cent, whUe
the nominal rate climbs steeply.
Daniel Holland pointed out the same divergence
between nominal and real rates of return in the United
States, United Kingdom, and Sweden as in Canada.
An interesting difference noted by Holland between
the U.S. and Canada was that the dispar,i,ty was as
pronounced ten years after the' war; as in the recent
decade.
A similar story concerning the gaps between
nominal and real could be told for the rates of return
on capital employed in manufacturing in Canada and
the rates of return on net worth for both sectors. One
difference rs the greater degree of variability. It makes
sense that a highly cyclical industry like rnanutactur-
ing should exhibit wider fluctuations than the non-
farm, non-financial sector as a whole, It is also
reasonable that return on net worth should be more
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volatile than return on capital employed. Daniel
Holland reported similar findings tor the U.S.
Tarasofsky observed that the fact that real rates ot
return on net worth were generally higher than those
on capital employed suggested that actual intlation
was higher than anticipated and that shareholders
have been earning gains at the expense ot lenders.
This was questioned by Michel Proulx who thought it
might have more to do with the risk premium on the
return to equity investment.
The impact ot inflation on real rates of return was
examined by Tarasotsky using econometric tech-
niques. His conclusion was that inflation was not a
signiticant factor as regards the real after-tax rates of
return on capital employed in either sector and the
real atter-tax rate of return on net worth in the non-
farm, non-financial sector. In manufacturing, inflation
had a significant negative impact on the real rate of
return on net worth.
Michel Proulx, in a somewhat different context,
raised the question of the meaning of the inflation
variable. While he acknowledged that a general
inflation should only affect after-tax profitability
through its impact in raising taxes, he suggested that
inflation resulting from some sources could have a
different impact depending on the nature of the
inflation. For instance, inflation stemming from
relative price changes such as increases in real
energy prices can affect after-tax profitability. This
was confirmed by some preliminary statistical work
that he had done.
Tarasofsky also displayed the relationship between
the real after-tax rate of return and the after-tax cost
of funds. He said that this data showed an adverse
relationship between 1973 and 1978 with a more
favourable relationship developing as the 1970s drew
to a close. Tarasofsky interpreted this as possibly
being another indication that the corporate sector as
a whole had by now learned to live with a chronically
high rate of inflation. This was contested by Michel
Proulx.
More telling evidence on inflation-induced distor-
tions in financial reporting at the industry and firm
level was presented by Bert Waslander for a subsam-
pie of the Financial Post data base of 152 firms for
which John Bossons had calculated inflation adjust-
ments. Waslander found that the inflation-induced
distortions in reported operating income display
substantial variation among industry averages as well
as among individual firms. The differences among
industries are particularly large for the cost of sales
adjustment, reflecting the varying importance of
inventory holdinqs across industries. Waslander
attributed the variation of inflation-induced errors for
individual firms around industry group averages to the
depreciation adjustment, which is in turn related to
the age of fixed assets and the share of fixed assets
in total capital employed. Waslander also noted that
"small" firms (though large enough to be in the
Financial Post data base) tend to have larger inflation-
induced errors than large firms and that inflation-
induced errors were negatively related to the real
return on capital employed. Waslander interpreted his
analysis as confirming that "the incidence of inflation
on real returns is uneven across industries and firms."
He suspected that this "must have undesirable
effects on resource allocation and points to an
inequitable distribution of tax and inflation burdens."
Keith Brewer also presented some interesting
evidence on inflation-induced distortions using data
from Statistics Canada, Industrial Corporations,
Financial Statistics. His analysis incorporated the
same adjustments as Waslander's plus an additional
adjustment for the reduction in the real value of net
debt. Brewer noted that, for metal mines, the distor-
tion was very volatile whereas, tor manufacturing, it
grew more steadily with inflation. He also pointed out
that in 1980 profits of the mineral fuels sector are
only slightly misrepresented since the depreciation
and debt adjustment are offsetting, but in the manu- .
facturing sector as a whole inflation-adjusted profits I
are only 72 per cent of reported profits. The principle" .
reason tor the difference between the manufacturing
and resource sectors is the larger understatement of
inventory costs resulting trom the combination of first
in, first out (FIFO) inventory valuation procedures and
a longer average time spent in inventory. Brewer also
made the observation that his data indicated that,
even in the 1960s, a period of relative price stability,
distortions were far from uniform across both indus-
tries and time.
Michael Alexander also provided striking concrete
examples of the unevenness of distortions in financial
reporting by showing inflation-adjusted and historical
cost financial statements for three companies, taken
from the public data base of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board's (FASB) Financial Accounting
Statement 33 (FAS 33).
Michael Mackenzie presented inflation-adjusted
income for U.S. and U.K. banks, which diverged
substantially from reported income. In many cases,
inflation-adjusted income was but a fraction of
reported income with the fraction varying significantly
across banks. If anyone needed to be convinced of
the significance of inflation-induced distortions before
coming to the conference, enough persuasive evi-
dence on this question was surely presented.
The Impact of Inflation-Induced Distortions
One of the main reasons for concern about infla-
tion-induced distortions in financial reporting is their
possible impact on the appropriate size and structure
of public and private investment in Canada. If busi-
ness and government do not have access to accurate
and reliable information on real rates of return, and if
tax burdens are shifted arbitrarily and haphazardly
among industries and firms by inflation, how can
businessmen make good investment decisions and
how can government formulate appropriate overall
policies affecting investment? This concern was
voiced by David Slater at the outset of the confer-
ence. It was identified by Michel Proulx as requiring
attention in future research. Several other partici-
pants also noted the issue in passing. Morley English
observed that the question as to how responsive total
output would be to improved income measurement
and distribution of taxes was not discussed in any
detail at the conference. Nevertheless, it remained an
important underlying theme of the conference.
A related topic that was examined in some depth
at the conference pertained to the ability of capital
markets to function efficiently in the presence of
inflation. This was inflation-induced distortions in
stock market values.
Franco Modigliani persuasively put forward his
controversial view that stock prices have failed to
keep pace with inflation in the U.S. because partici-
pants in the stock market have not used the correct
rational valuation procedures because of confusion
over the significance of inflation. This view is regarded
as heresy by those that believe financial markets
function efficiently. Modigliani argued that, instead of
capitalizing using real rates of return, they have
incorrectly used nominal rates that incorporated an
inflation premium similar in magnitude to that exhib-
ited by nominal interest rates. A further reason why
inflation might have adversely affected stock market
values was also adduced by Modigliani. It was that
participants may have failed to correct earnings
properly for the gain on the inflation-induced
depreciation of monetary liabilities. In short, partici-
pants do not realize that interest expenses are
overstated. According to Modigliani, these valuation
errors would produce a rather dramatic result. Stock
prices would be trading at about half the level con-
sistent with rational valuation procedures.
John Grant examined Modigliani's hypothesis using
Canadian data. The first fact Grant stressed was that,
in contrast to the experience in the U.S., Canadian
equities have, except for a few periods in the 1970s,
generally kept ahead of inflation. In addition, a model
built by Grant and Arif Sayeed at Wood Gundy
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satisfactorily explains the movements in the Toronto
Stock Exchange Composite Index by assuming that
investors discount their expectation of future real
dividends at a real rate. Thus, there is no need to
postulate irrational behaviour in Canada as Modigliani
does in the U.S. to explain stock market behaviour.
Franco Modigliani found Grant's paper to be an
important piece of evidence to add to the other
international material he was collecting. However, he
was unconvinced by Grant's analysis. In particular,
picking up on an earlier point made by David Slater,
he wondered to what extent Grant's results
depended on the predominance of resource-based
industries in the TSE index with their fundamentally
different determinants of performance. Modigliani
also questioned the degree to which Grant's real
discount rate moved like a nominal interest rate. He
suggested, following up on a comment by Bossons,
that it makes no sense to rely on leverage as an
explanatory variable for a real rate. Grant responded
that he had excluded the oil and gas industry from his
model and it had not deteriorated substantially. Grant
defended the leverage variable on the grounds that
the real discount rate would be affected by the risk of
bankruptcy, which is related to nominal leverage. In
any event, given the disagreement between Modi-
gliani and Grant, the rationality of the Canadian stock
market has not been proven to everyone's satisfac-
tion.
New Reporting Rules
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants
(CICA) issued an exposure draft in December 1979
proposing a system of current cost accounting. A
revised version reflecting representations will be
forthcoming in the near future. Pending its release,
James Goodfellow outlined the CICA'S earlier pro-
posals. Current cost income on two bases is to be
disclosed: current cost income of the enterprise, and
the current cost income attributable to shareholders.
Current cost income is historical cost income
adjusted for depreciation, cost of sales, net produc-
tive monetary items, and other impacts of specific
price changes on productive assets. Current cost
income attributable to shareholders incorporates,
among other things, a financing adjustment to reflect
the impact on net borrowings. The change in the
current cost of inventories and property, plant, and
equipment would also be disclosed. These disclo-
sures would only be required of large enterprises with
publicly traded securities and with inventories,
property, plant, and equipment totaling more than
$50 million or with assets more than $350 million.
Broadly, the propos,r isclosure package was
similar to that under FA-~B 16 in the U.K., but it
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differed in many significant respects from that in the
U.S. under FAS 33.
While James Goodfellow never said as much, it
could be inferred from his vigorous defence of the
exposure draft against all categories of critics that its
revised version will likely retain the essence of the
earlier recommendations. He did stress, however, the
need for flexibility for specialized industries so that
management can provide the most meaningful
information. The presence of some ot these critics at
the conference made for some Iively sessions and
helped to highlight the key issues.
John Boersema argued that General Price Level
Accounting (GPLA), now referred to as constant
dollar accounting, using a single index such as the
gross national expenditure (GNE) deflator, is the best
way to produce financial statements that are not
distorted by inflation, yet meet the same objectives
as historical cost statements. He objected to the
exposure draft's rejection of financial capital in favour
of a concept of maintaining operating capacity.
Boersema illustrated the impact of GPLA on the
financial position of Shell Canada Limited. On a GPLA
basis, Shell's 1980 net earnings were $246 million or
30 per cent less than the $355 million earnings on a
traditional accounting basis. This would cut the rate
of return on capital roughly in half.
Gary Corlett also favoured taking this kind of broad
brush view of the impact of inflation on the ability of a
company to stay healthy, which he recalled was the
type of approach recommended by the Ontario
Committee on Inflation Accounting. He contended
that the constant dollar approach can produce
90 per cent of the benefits of the current cost
approach for 10 per cent of the work.
In contrast, Jarnes GoodfeHow thought that there
are problems with constant dollar accounting. He
could not see how statements expressed in units of
general purchasing power could be more useful than
those expressed in terms of money. He maintained
that it was not very relevant to use a general price
index, such as the consumer price index, to adjust
specific non-monetary items, such as steel mills, in
financial statements. In saying this, he was careful to
point out that he did not mean to suggest that
information based on general price changes does not
provide a useful standard of comparison for specific
price changes.
Michael Alexander also supported the current cost
approach. He was encouraged by the growing
support in the U.S. for the FASS'S action to implement
current cost accounting with Statement 33. Accord-
ing to Alexander, a large majority of accounting firms
now favour the current cost approach over the use of
a general index because of its greater usefulness.
The CICA exposure draft called for full supplemen-
tary disclosure. Michael Alexander regarded the
introduction of change through supplementary
disclosure to the basic financial statements as a
"practical approach because it does not replace the
existing system on which we have to rely - yet it
enables analysis and use of additional information."
Michael Fogg believed that, in choosing between full
and partial supplementary disclosure, the U.S. partial
approach was more useful than the U.K. full
approach upon which the CICA exposure draft was
patterned. Seymour Wig le went even further in
volunteering his opinion that, if the CICA had favoured
the U.S. approach at an earlier date, we might
already have had something in place.
However, Michael Alexander only viewed supple-
mentary reporting as a temporary solution. He said
that, since it is difficult to ignore the impact of
material price changes in the basic financial state-
ments and still provide a meaningful and useful result,
in the long run price changes would have to be
recognized in the basic financial accounting model.
The net debt adjustment, which is made to allow
for the extent to which profits are understated for the
decline in the real value of outstanding net debt in
calculating current cost income attributable to
shareholders is probably the most controversial of the
inflation adjustments. This is probably because it
does not represent a cash inflow and because it runs
counter to the conservative approach leaning
towards the understatement of profits preferred by
the accounting profession. Government officials, as
noted by Michael Alexander, have tended to favour a
debt adjustment. Such an adjustment does have the
advantage from their point of view of protecting the
corporate tax base. Many economists have also
advocated a debt adjustment. With respect to the
point that there is no associated cash inflow, Franco
Modigliani argued that there would be if the firm
maintained the same leverage policy.
Some of the participants made some interesting
observations that have bearing on the debt adjust-
ment issue. Michael Alexander gave everyone pause
for reflection when he pointed out that, after adjusting
for the impact of inflation on long-term debt, it would
be General Motors with its healthy debt-equity ratio
and not Chrysler that would now be in trouble. Paul
Clough expressed concern about any method of
inflation adjustment that gives lots of "credit" for
"lots of debt." He quoted with approval a Swiss
banker who said this was not a "recipe for survival."
Bill Detlefsen was also concerned about creating
gains from borrowing or working capital deficiency
situations. Along more anecdotal lines, Michael Fogg
reported that his wife, upon being informed of their
family's gain on debt, went out and spent it. On the
pro side of the debt adjustment issue, James Good-
fellow argued that the failure of accountants to
provide information on the benefits of holding debt in
inflationary times was misleading. It presents the bad
news only without the good news.
The presentations focusing on the problems of
accounting for inflation in particular industries or
sectors gave a valuable and different perspective on
the overall issue. The sectors represented were the
extractive industries - oil and gas, in particular -
integrated aluminum production, regulated industries,
financial institutions, and - last but not least - small
business. Most had some criticisms of the CICA
exposure draft.
John Boersema found fault with the CICA exposure
draft for being irrelevant and impracticable for the oil
and gas resource sector. For oil and gas reserves,
which are unique, finite, depleting resources that will
not be replaced in kind, the concept of "service
potential" is impossible to measure and of question-
able utility.
John Schoonover also found the "service
potential" concept to be unworkable for large
multinationals such as Alcan for which the replace-
ment of a fixed asset may involve a different type of
asset in perhaps another country where conditions
and performance might be quite different. He won-
dered if the development of replacement intentions
for fixed assets to determine "service potential" can
be considered an effective use of management's time
for a "what if" excercise. Boersema thought it might
be more profitable to use the resources searching for
oil and gas.
The accounting problems of the oil and gas indus-
try are compounded by disagreements over the
appropriate methodology for preparing historical cost
financial statements. Large companies tend to
expense dry holes, while small companies capitalize
them. This is the distinction between the "successful
eHorts" and "full cost" approach to accounting for
exploration and development expenditures. There is
also the issue of reserve recognition accounting,
which Keith Brewer considered a promising way of
valuing reserves.
John Boerserna argued that with unresolved
accounting problems such as these the solution
appears to be supplementary disclosure. This would
include information on reserves and would obviate
the need for current cost disclosures. Overall com-
pany-wide information on the impact of inflation
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could be provided through GPLA or constant dollar
accounting.
Bill Detlefsen expressed his agreement with John
Boersema. He also oHered his opinion that efforts to
develop an accounting approach for inflation have so
far failed in the extreme case of the extractive indus-
tries. He wondered if inflation adjustment can be
successful in general even if it is not applicable in
extreme situations.
Paul Clough characterized the problems of regu-
lated industries as being the same as all businesses,
with regulatory problems added as a layer on top.
One of these problems is that the regulatory process
is based on historical costs. Clough was encouraged
that Canadian Pacific Limited's proposal for handling
the inflated cost of assets, "The Current Value Cost
of Capital," has been put on the Canadian Transport
Commission's agenda. On the other hand, Clough
was not very satisfied with the meaningfulness and
comprehensibility of the replacement cost informa-
tion that his own firm and others were supplying the
Securities and Exchange Commission in the U.S. He
judged that it might be worth some additional delay in
Canada to ensure that inflation accounting standards
produce meaningful and understandable figures.
For financial institutions, Michael Mackenzie noted
that they were specifically excluded from the recom-
mended coverage of the Cl CA exposure draft. A Task
Force of the Canadian Bankers' Association reported
in early 1981 on the exposure draft. It noted that the
most significant effect of inflation on banks was the
gradual erosion of capital. While it came out against
rigidly applying current cost accounting to banks, it
proposed the publication of supplementary informa-
tion along the lines of that required in the U.S.
Mackenzie personally thought that the publication of
inflation-adjusted information might help to call
attention to some problems for financial institutions
created by inflation. These would include the facts
that real growth is substantially less than nominal,
capital is eroded by deposit growth, and income is
overstated if allowance is not made for current cost
depreciation and rentals.
Small business was not covered by the CICA'S
exposure draft on account of its protests over an
earlier exposure draft, according to Irving Rosen. He
asserted that the small businessman does not under-
stand current cost accounting information and has no
use for it, since it just makes unnecessary work.
Rosen noted that there is a limit on the resources that
the average small businessman can spend on
accounting advice as well as on the capacity of the
profession to meet the demands. Current cost
accounting could be, as Rosen sees it, "the straw
that might break the camel's back."
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Many obstacles to the acceptance of inflation
accounting were cited at the conference. Michael
Alexander said that business is concerned about the
way capital markets might react to lower inflation-
adjusted profits. Also a larger number of profession-
als have a vested interest in the present historical
cost system. Also, according to Irving Rosen, the
small businessman is afraid that current cost
.accounting would make it more difficult to obtain
bank loans, since it would cast a less favourable light
on the firm's financial health. Ironically, banks for
their part, according to Michael Mackenzie, do not
want to publish inflation-adjusted information,
because it would make it more difficult to raise
money. Perhaps, if this is indeed the case, banks
might show a little more sympathy for the hard-
pressed small businessman than Rosen might expect.
Many of the participants stressed that usefulness
should be a prime criterion for any inflation-adjusted
accounting data. Michael Alexander considered it too
early to tell how useful the FASB'S FAS 33 data was
. for decision makers. Michael Fogg knew of little
evidence that the data was being used outside of the
firms except by investment analysts. Michael Mack-
enzie noted that there was no evidence of use of the
inflation-adjusted information for financial institutions
in the U.S. and U.K. On the other hand, both Michael
Alexander and Michael Fogg were encouraged by the
interest shown at a recent conference on how to use
inflation-adjusted information for management
purposes sponsored by the Financial Executives
Institute. Michael Alexander quoted one executive as
saying to his staff, "If I am going to be accountable
to shareholders on an inflation-adjusted basis, then I
am going to hold you as managers accountable in the
same way." By the same token, Seymour Wigle
contrasted the willingness of management in the U.K.
to develop sophisticated internal data to gain com-
petitive advantage with their unenthusiastic approach
to developing data in the Statement of Standard
Accounting Practice 16 (SSAP 16).
One possible use of inflation-adjusted financial
information is to justify earnings to the public. John
Boersema was skeptical of this, however. He showed
how for his company, Shell Canada Limited, profits
could be stated in 1980 at $335 million on a historical
cost basis, versus $65 million on a CICA exposure
draft basis. He wondered if, given the suspicion with
which oil company profits are presently viewed, the
public would accept such revised numbers. On the
other hand, Michael Mackenzie thought that the
publication of restated earnings might assist financial
institutions in explaining their earnings.
Michael Alexander made the critical point that, to
be useful, inflation-accounting data must be capable
of being viewed from both a micro and macro per-
spective. It would thus help to bridge the gap
between the microeconomic decisions made by
business and the government's macroeconomic
management. This would mean that the data must be
aggregatable. The FASB'S Statement 33 data bank
meets this bill.
Michael Alexander and James Goodfellow both
made strong pleas to the accounting profession for
leadership in establishing new accounting standards
adequately reflecting the impact of inflation. In
addition, there was something of a consensus among
participants in favour of an experimental approach.
Michael Alexander characterized the U.S. approach
as represented currently by FAS 33 as a kind of
"experimental patchwork."
Inflation-Induced Distortions
in Taxation
The Distortions
Inflation-induced distortions in reported income
carry over directly into the corporate tax base.
Corporate tax revenue is thus increased by the extent
to which replacement cost depreciation and cost of
sales exceeds historical cost and is decreased by the
overstatement of interest expenses. A priori, the net
effect on corporate tax revenue cannot be predicted,
but Abe Tarasofsky presented data taken from a
Department of Finance study showing that the real
effective tax rate (adjusted for inflation) was higher
than the nominal rate on average over the 1976-78
period by about 11.5 percentage points for the non-
farm, non-financial sector and by 15 percentage
points for manufacturing. Inflation-induced distortions
in reported income could also be expected to shift
the tax burden among industries and firms creating
an uneven pattern of taxation that was related to the
industries' and firms' holdings of fixed assets and
inventories and their outstanding debt. This was
demonstrated by Bert Waslander. Another tax-
related distortion noted by John Bossons was the
favourable tax treatment of owner-occupied housing
relative to other assets such as equities. These tax
distortions would no doubt lead to a misallocation of
resources.
While there was no difference of opinion among the
participants of the conference concerning the tend-
ency of inflation per se to raise corporate tax reve-
nues and the resulting distortions in the tax structure,
there was substantial disagreement over whether or
not the effective corporate tax rate has actually
increased as a result of inflation. There are two
questions at issue here. The first is the extent to
which the discretionary tax cuts introduced by the
government in recent years, such as the two-year
write-off and lower tax rate for manufacturing,
investment tax credits, and the 3 per cent inventory
valuation adjustment, offset the impact of inflation.
e second is more philosophical. It relates to the
degree to which the tax cuts can be considered a
general policy response to inflation.
On the first issue, Abe Tarasofsky asserted on the
basis of Department of Finance data that there has
been a distinct upward shift in average tax rates in
both the non-farm, non-financial sector and the
manufacturing sector. Bert Waslander contended
using the Financial Post-Bossons data base referred
to above that average effective tax rates on profits
have risen consistently over the period for the 152
firms in his sample to the point where in 1976-78 they
were approximately equal to the statutory tax rate.
Waslander cautioned that these results could be
exaggerating the increase in the effective tax rate
somewhat because of low real rates of return in the
sample studied.
Waslander also examined the 58 manufacturing
firms in his sample separately. For them, he con-
cluded that the tax reductions enacted in the 1970s
to lower the effective tax rate in manufacturing
relative to other firms did not offset the effect of
inflation-induced tax increases. Thus, the effective tax
rate for manufacturing rose significantly to the point
where it was higher than for corporations in general.
This resulted from the larger relative inflation adjust-
ments for manufacturing relating to higher-than-
average depreciation rates and inventories and to a
relatively low utilization of long-term debt.
Michel Proulx disagreed strongly with both Tara-
sofsky's and Waslander's conclusions. He said, with
respect to Tarasofsky's conclusions, that there were
two caveats attached to the analysis of effective tax
rates in the Department of Finance study that had to
be borne in mind. One was a break in the effective
tax rate series in 1977 as a result of a change in the
sample of corporations covered by Industrial Corpo-
rations, Financial Statistics, the data source, which
would render intertemporal comparisons less mean-
ingful. The second was a rise in losses, due to the
calculation of the average tax rates on the basis of
aggregate profits net of losses, which could lead to
an illusory increase in the tax burden.
To gauge the quantitative significance of this latter
effect, Proulx used the Financial Post-Bossons data
base. He noted that this data base had been sub-
stantially revised from that used by Waslander. His
conclusion was that average real effective tax rates
based upon companies with positive net income
would have increased slightly for the non-financial
corporate sector as a whole from 1966-69 to
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1974-79, would have increased substantially in
resource based industries, and would not show any
upward trend in the non-resource industries as a
whole or in the manufacturing sector. This latter result
contrasted with the conclusions drawn by Tarasofsky
and Waslander. It was also confirmed, according to
Proulx, by some further analysis using the annual
corporate financial and taxation statistics data. In
addition, Keith Brewer supported Proulx's contention
that the effective tax rate in manufacturing did not
increase.
Concerning the philosophical question of whether
the discretionary tax cuts can be considered a policy
response to inflation, there was substantial disagree-
ment. James Tyrrell argued that they could not, since
they were introduced for quite different reasons, such
as to compensate for the tax incentive for domestic
international sales corporations (DISCS) in the U.S. or
to stimulate needed investment in certain sectors,
rather than to offset the effect of inflation. Paul
Clough also adopted this position claiming that the
use of capital cost allowances and investment tax
credits is misunderstood by politicians and the public
who confuse them with some form of adjustment for
the inflated cost of replacing assets.
On the other side of the question was, notably,
Morley English from the Department of Finance, who
argued that, while the measures were not adopted
exclusively because of inflation, they were adopted in
an inflationary environment to respond to the prob-
lems posed by that environment. Indeed, some
measures, such as the 3 per cent jrventory valuation
adjustment, were specifically interned to compensate
for inflation. For others, the connection is less obvi-
ous, but perhaps no less real. Seymour Wigle also
differed from James Tyrrell in viewing fast write-offs
as having an element of response to inflation.
Whether or not tax cuts were introduced and
actually succeeded to offset the impact of inflation on
aggregate effective tax rates, the fact still remains
that inflation has distorted effective tax rates among
industries and firms from those intended by policy
makers. This brings us to proposals to reform the
corporate tax system and reduce these distortions,
thereby improving resource allocation.
Proposals for Reform
The first issue under this rubric is, Should the
proposals for reform involve net corporate tax
reductions or just a redistribution of tax burdens?
Those such as James Tyrrell, who believe there has
been a significant increase in tax burden because of
inflation, favour large net tax cuts. Others, such as
Morley English, argue that any proposals should be
"revenue neutral" (meaning unchanged corporate
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tax revenues). This would require that any tax cuts to
compensate for inflation should be financed by
corporate tax increases elsewhere, producing losers
as well as gainers. By the same token, Seymour
Wigle noted that as a realist he could not overlook
the need of the government for revenues, and Keith
Brewer thought that it would be more realistic to
expect a shift in the intercorporate distribution of the
total business tax burden than to lower taxation all
around.
Many proposals to reform the corporate tax system
were discussed at the conference. Since the govern-
ment has indicated that it is awaiting "a comprehen-
sive inflation accounting system," perhaps a solution
would be to base the corporate tax on inflation-
adjusted income as measured under such a system
when it eventually surfaces and is accepted.
Interestingly enough, none of the participants
explicitly advanced this particular proposal. Instead,
James Tyrrell argued that the forthcoming recom-
.mendations of the accounting profession concerning
standards will be by way of broad guidelines for
supplementary reporting, which would not qualify as
"a comprehensive inflation accounting system."
Furthermore, he indicated that this was not the
answer to the problem in any event, since tax laws
must be written in clear and unequivocal language,
and since any correction for inflation should err on
the side of simplicity in order to meet the equity test.
.Morley English agreed that there would be impor-
tant factors that could lead to divergence between an
inflation accounting tax system and a financial
reporting system. He noted that there were already
significant differences between tax and book
depreciation and that such differences would prob-
ably continue. In particular, he could not see how the
Department of National Revenue could practicably
audit taxes based on price indexes prepared by plant
engineers.
John Boersema also stressed that the separation of
tax accounting and financial reporting should be
recognized and that an accounting solution should
not be pushed in the hope that it might result in a tax
break. Seymour Wigle noted the example of the U.K.
where inflation-adjusted accounting standards did
not result in tax recognition, the government's prior
encouragement notwithstanding. He warned that the
same thing could happen in Canada.
Another issue that would arise in the context of a
tax system based on "a comprehensive inflation
accounting system" is the appropriateness of levying
taxes on any adjustment to correct profits for the
overstatement of interest expenses. Since the recipi-
ents of the interest income are already being taxed
r
on the full amount, this approach would involve an
element of double taxation. This illustrates the
importance of addressing the question of inflation-
induced distortions in the measurement of real
income in the broader context of the overall taxation
of investment income in the hands of individuals as
well as businesses.
The second proposal, which was put forward by
Gary Corlett, would be to abolish the corporate
income tax altogether. There could be no denying
that this would succeed in eliminating the inflation-
induced distortions in tax burdens among corpora-
tions. However, to avoid introducing distortions
between the non-taxed corporate and the taxed non-
corporate sector, the proposal would have to become
considerably more complicated along the lines of the
Carter Commission recommendation, whereby the
corporate and personal income tax system would be
integrated by attributing corporate source income to
shareholders and taxing it at their marginal rate, with
a credit for corporate taxes paid. Otherwise individu-
als could avoid taxes by retaining their income in
corporations. Moreover, to eliminate inflation-induced
distortions, it would have to be inflation-adjusted
income that would be attributed. Thus, the initial
simplicity of Corlett's proposal vanishes on closer
inspection.
The rest of the proposals would qualify as ad hoc
measures. The third proposal advanced by John
Bossons is to index capital consumption allowances
on the equity-financed portion of new investment.
Limiting the indexation to the equity portion is in
recognition of untaxed real gains on outstanding
debt. This proposal is attractive from the
government's point of view, since it minimizes its
revenue loss by not granting tax relief on the existing
capital stock. It thus provides a large investment
stimulus at a minimal cost, as evidenced by Bossons'
simulations of the effect of the proposal with the
FOCUS econometric model of the Institute of Policy
Analysis.
John Boersema also favoured indexing capital
consumption allowances to some general index. But
he did not specifically limit the indexing to new
investment and to the equity financed portion, and he
called for a similar indexing of inventory values to
improve the inventory valuation adjustment.
The fourth proposal, put forward by James Tyrrell
on behalf of The Canadian Manufacturers' Associa-
tion, was for indexing of equity. It protects the
purchasing power of the owner's equity from taxation
by allowing a deduction from taxable income equal to
the product of equity and the rate of change in the
GNE deflator. If the cost is too great for the govern-
ment to bear at the present time, it could be phased
in. The advantage of this proposal is its simplicity.
Tyrrell acknowledged that it does not get at the root
of the problem of distortions in tax burden caused by
interindustry and interfirm variation in capital intensity
and life, inventory holdings, working capital, and
debt.
The final proposal mentioned by Michael Fogg and
Irving Rosen was for the allowance of last in, first out
(lIFO) for inventory valuation for tax purposes instead
of first in, first out (FIFO). This would follow the current
practice in the U.S. and would mostly eliminate the
taxation of illusory inventory profits as long as
inventory stocks were growing. If stocks were liqui-
dated earlier, lower prices would be used for valua-
tion, and illusory inventory profits would reappear. It
would presumably replace the existing 3 per cent
inventory valuation deduction, which Tyrrell and
Rosen consider to be inadequate. Incidentally, it is
not so clear that this is indeed the case to the extent
that the inventories are financed by debt. Robin
Boadway, Neil Bruce, and Jack Mintz of Queen's
University have demonstrated in a paper presented at
the 1981 Canadian Economic Association meetings
that, even with FIFa, the 3 per cent inventory allow-
ance is probably more than adequate as a result of
the full deductibility of nominal interest charges to
finance the inventory holdings. Some of those, such
as Irving Rosen, who favour the adoption of LlFO to
handle the problem of the taxation of illusory inven-
tory profits due to inflation also support some form of
Synopsis 11
accelerated or indexed capital consumption allow-
ances.
In developing proposals for reforming the corporate
tax to take inflation into account, Michael Fogg
identified an additional problem faced by a small
open economy such as Canada, which is of less
concern in the U.S. and U.K. It is the need for interna-
tional harmonization. In a similar vein, Morley English
warned that, with so many foreign subsidiaries in
Canada, tax reductions to eliminate distortions could
possibly have the unintended result of raising foreign
taxes, thus transferring tax revenue to foreign fiscs.
He also pointed out that a markedly different tax
base in Canada from those abroad would pose both
problems and opportunities for creative tax account-
ing.
Conclusions
These are the main issues addressed at the confer-
ence as I see them. Many of them are far from
resolved. At the conference, we succeeded in lifting
veil after inflationary veil only to discover yet more
veils underneath. Nevertheless, as the number of veils
diminished, it was possible to gain a better apprecia-
tion of the underlying economic structure. For a
similar appreciation, the reader is encouraged to turn
to the abstracts of the papers presented at the
conference, contained in these proceedings. In
perusing them, he will no doubt develop his own
interpretations of the issues.
